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We critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy 
architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change.  We employ six criteria 
to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost 
effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for 
participation and compliance.  The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of 
criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions.  We 
identify several major themes among the alternative proposals:  Kyoto is “too little, too 
fast”; developing countries should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to 
participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those 
with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately 
addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the 
evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between 
cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.  
Keywords:  policy architecture, Kyoto Protocol, efficiency, cost effectiveness, 
equity, participation, compliance  
 *Aldy is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Economics at Harvard University; Barrett is Professor of Environmental
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1The general importance of focusing on policy “architecture” and institutions in the global climate domain was first
noted by Schmalensee (1996, 1998).   See also:  Victor and Salt, 1995; Stavins, 1997; Sandalow and Bowles, 2001.
2By “participation” we mean whether a country is a party to a treaty intended to mitigate emissions.  By “compliance”
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THIRTEEN PLUS ONE:  A COMPARISON
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY ARCHITECTURES
Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert N. Stavins
*
1.  INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus among both natural scientists and economists that a credible
approach is needed to address the threat of global climate change (Watson et al., 2001).  The Kyoto
Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change may or may not come into force,
but serious questions have been raised regarding the Protocol’s anticipated performance.  A variety
of alternative policy architectures
1 have been proposed, including thirteen that have been developed
by economists and other scholars.  In this paper, we review these thirteen proposals plus the Kyoto
Protocol in the light of key performance criteria.
In Part 2 of the paper, we explore the six criteria for assessing global climate policy regimes.
In Part 3, we describe the fundamental characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol and alternative policy
architectures; and in Part 4, we synthesize the key architectural elements of the proposed climate
regimes.  In Part 5, we conclude.
2.  ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA
FOR ASSESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY REGIMES
Six potential criteria can guide an assessment of proposed global climate policy regimes:
(1) the environmental outcome; (2) dynamic efficiency; (3) dynamic cost-effectiveness; (4)
distributional equity (both cross-sectional and intertemporal); (5) flexibility in the presence of new
information; and (6) participation and compliance 
2.  The last criterion has frequently been ignored,
but is essential for achievement of the first four criteria.  While climate negotiations have focused
on cost-effectiveness, attainment of this objective requires more than flexible mechanisms; it
requires full participation. Similarly, the negotiations leading up to Kyoto emphasized the need for3From an economic perspective, the environmental outcome criterion is redundant, given the dynamic efficiency
criterion.  Any policy that satisfies dynamic efficiency delivers the socially optimal environmental outcome.  But policy
debates in international climate negotiations reveal much more interest in environmental outcomes (or proxies, such as
emissions) than in efficiency.
4The Helsinki Protocol, for example, required that parties reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions by 30 percent.  Actual
emissions fell by more than 30 percent. This might suggest that the agreement succeeded environmentally, but the
agreement did not significantly affect behavior (Levy, 1993; Barrett, 2003).  In the absence of the treaty, most of the
emission reductions would likely have occurred anyway.
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stringent targets, but these are of little or no environmental benefit if participation is low or if parties
fail to comply.
2.1  The Environmental Outcome
For many participants in the global climate policy process, particularly non-economists, the
most important criterion for assessing alternative policy regimes is the likely magnitude of
environmental outcomes.
3  The stock nature of climate change complicates any ranking of policies,
because policies may differ in their respective time paths of changes in net emissions.  Policies can
take a wide variety of emissions paths to achieve the same steady-state atmospheric concentrations
(Wigley et al., 1996).  While an economic assessment would indicate similar if not identical impacts
from climate change at any given steady-state concentration, the rate of climatic change would vary
across policies and result in different transitional impacts (on the cost side of the ledger).
Environmental effectiveness is difficult to measure in this domain.  Uncertainties abound in
predicting global climate change, particularly in terms of economically-relevant geographic scales;
quantifying biophysical impacts; and monetizing impacts, especially for non-market goods and
services.  In order to estimate the impacts of particular policies, it is necessary to estimate what
countries would have done in the absence of policy, but such counterfactual baselines cannot be
observed.
4
The need to assess the environmental effectiveness of climate policies raises another
difficulty if the policies induce “emissions leakage.”  If an international (but not fully global) climate
policy results in differences in marginal compliance costs among countries, then emissions may
“leak” from participating high-cost countries to non-participating low- or zero-cost countries
through one of two economic channels.
First, a policy may foster comparative advantage for low-cost countries (for example,
countries without emissions commitments) in the production of greenhouse gas-intensive goods and
services.  Some firms may relocate manufacturing plants from countries with emissions
commitments (and higher energy costs) to countries without emissions commitments.  In this case,
countries with commitments may comply with their obligations, but some of their emissions
reductions would be offset by increases in emissions in countries without commitments.
Second, the higher energy costs associated with compliance would reduce world energy
demand, depressing oil and coal prices.  Countries without emissions commitments would consume
more fossil fuels, offsetting some of the emissions reductions by countries with commitments.5Note that Pareto efficiency requires not only that aggregate net benefits be maximized but that no one be made worse
off by the policy change.  The practical question for policy is whether it is essential that no one actually be made worse
off or that no one potentially be made worse off.  This weaker condition is the frequently employed Kaldor-Hicks
criterion.  See Stavins (2001a) for a primer on global climate economics.  Although efficiency is an important criterion
for sound policy analysis, most economists think of benefit-cost analysis as no more than a tool to assist in decision
making.  Virtually all would agree, however, that the information in a well-done benefit-cost analysis can be of great
value in helping to make decisions about risk reduction policies (Arrow et al., 1996).
6The application of this criterion to climate change policies is challenging in those cases where the policy proposals do
not specify long-term emissions paths.  This also complicates the assessment of the environmental effectiveness of
climate policies, such as the Kyoto Protocol, which sets an emission constraint only for a five-year period.
7Comprehensive summaries are by Lind (1982) and Portney and Weyant (1999).  Recent research has suggested a
theoretical basis for employing lower discount rates for longer run analyses (Weitzman, 2001), and empirical research
has illustrated this in the presence of uncertainty (Newell and Pizer, 2000).  One study has suggested that for climate
change a negative discount rate is conceivable (Dasgupta, Mäler, and Barrett, 1999).
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Hence, a “narrow but deep” agreement may not significantly reduce net emissions, but largely
redistribute emissions.
2.2  Dynamic Efficiency
It seems reasonable to ask whether the gains outweigh the losses of a public policy, and thus
determine whether society as a whole is made better off as a result of the policy.  A global climate
policy that achieves maximum aggregate net benefits is said to be efficient.
5  Of course, global
climate change policy must address actions, impacts, benefits, and costs that occur over very long
time horizons.    Greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere because of their slow natural decay
rates. Moreover, thermal ocean mixing can delay climatic response.  In addition, private sector
responses to climate change policies can require significant changes in long-lived capital stock:  50
to 70 years for electricity generators, and 60 to 100 years for residential buildings, for example
(Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins, 1999).  Exogenous and endogenous technological change can have great
bearing on global climate change and policies to address it, especially over the long-term.  For all
three reasons, dynamic efficiency is an important criterion to employ.
6
To assess dynamic efficiency, economic analysis must account for people’s preferences over
consumption across time.  Individuals’ rates of time preference and expectations about future
income growth (which affects future consumption opportunities) influence how individuals discount
future consumption (Goulder and Stavins, 2002).  Individual behavior reflects these preferences in
market activities, such as buying and selling government bonds, home mortgages, and credit card
balances.  At the societal level, concerns for intergenerational equity loom large, in part because
explicit markets for intergenerational trade-offs do not exist.  As a general matter, future net benefits
should be discounted, but the appropriate value of the discount rate for very long-time horizons is
unclear.
7
Uncertainty in estimating benefits and costs also characterizes the global climate change
problem.  These uncertainties, the intertemporal nature of the problem, and the irreversible
characteristics of investment in climate protection (economic, if not physical irreversibility), create
the conditions for decision-makers to value delaying investment decisions (known as quasi-option8These two effects push a stochastic benefit-cost analysis of global climate policy in opposite directions.  Which is
dominant?  Although it has been argued that the second effect is more important (Kolstad, 1996), it is ultimately an
empirical question (Ulph and Ulph, 1997; Narain and Fisher, 2000).
9Efficiency subsumes cost-effectiveness.  A policy that satisfies the efficiency criterion provides the optimal path of net
emissions, and requires the cost-effective implementation of this path.
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value) until more information is available (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Hanemann, 1989; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Kolstad and Toman, 2000).  This value should, in principle, be included in the
calculation of benefits and costs.  In the global climate context, the irreversibilities include both the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the accumulation of capital investments
that cannot easily be reversed.
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2.3  Cost-Effectiveness
Although assessing the costs of global climate change mitigation is by no means a trivial
task, it is vastly easier than estimating the benefits of policy action.  The uncertainty in quantifying
regionally disaggregated biophysical impacts of climate change and the difficulty of monetizing
some categories of biophysical impacts substantially hinders such benefit estimation.  A less
demanding criterion circumvents the benefits estimation problem by focusing on cost-effectiveness,
in which the least costly means of achieving some given target or goal (which may or may not be
efficient) is identified.
9
Cost-effectiveness analysis cannot be used to compare policies with different benefit streams.
Moreover, relying on cost-effectiveness as an assessment criterion can lead to the identification of
a low-cost way of doing something that is fundamentally not sensible in economic terms.  That is,
it can lead to the identification of “fast trains to the wrong station.”  On the other hand, this kind of
analysis can reveal that some policy measures are simply inferior to others.
2.4  Equity
An exceptionally important issue in global climate change policy is the distribution of the
benefits and costs of policy action, both cross-sectionally and over time.  Although economists have
given considerable thought over the years to the possibility of using weights to incorporate
distributional considerations into determinations of efficiency, there is no consensus, nor likely to
be one, on what those weights ought to be.  It is reasonable, instead, to estimate benefits and costs,
and separately provide as much information as possible to decision makers about winners and losers.
Assessments of international, intra-national, and intergenerational distributions of the
benefits and costs of alternative policy regimes are necessary for the identification of equitable
climate strategies.  A number of criteria merit consideration (Goulder, 2000).  First, the criterion of
responsibility would suggest that — other things equal — those nations that are most responsible
for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should take on the greatest burden for
containing the problem.  Second, the criterion of ability to pay implies that the wealthier nations that
possess greater capacity should lead the response to the global climate change problem. Third, the
criterion of the distribution of benefits suggests that those nations which stand to benefit most from5
action taken ought to take on greater shares of the cost burden.  The first two considerations suggest
that industrialized nations should bear the principal burdens for dealing with the prospect of climate
change. The third criterion suggests that developing countries should shoulder a relatively higher
burden, as compared with the other equity criteria (though note that, while developing countries may
be relatively the most vulnerable to climate change, the absolute benefits of mitigation are likely to
be greater for industrialized countries).
Though the focus of our attention is with mitigation, it is important to note that climate
policy may also involve adaptation. Since future climate change is unavoidable, given the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that has already occurred and their relatively
gradual decay rates, individuals, institutions, and ecosystems will need to adapt.  Hence, an efficient
response to climate change would include a substantial adaptation component.  Just as the burden
for emissions mitigation raises questions for equity, so does adaptation.  For example, the notions
of responsibility and ability to pay could translate into technical and financial assistance from
industrialized countries to developing countries for adaptation, as well as for mitigation.
The long time-horizon of the global climate change problem and potential policy responses
raises important issues of intergenerational equity.  While some have called for the use of low
discount rates for long time-horizons (such as in the climate context), the use of discounting in
benefit-cost analysis has ambiguous effects.  A zero or low discount rate might not favor future
generations, because it would distort investment decisions among climate change policies and other
policies (in which a standard, positive discount rate would guide the decision-making).   As a result,
society may pass up opportunities to employ other, non-climate policies that could benefit future
generations.  A world with “too much” climate change investment and “too little” non-climate policy
investment may make future generations worse off, not better off.  More broadly, Schelling (1998)
has highlighted the trade-off that may exist between policies to address intergenerational equity and
those that address (current) distributional equity:  acting to protect future generations (who
presumably will be better off materially than current ones) means that fewer resources will be
available to help today’s poor in developing countries.
2.5  Policy Flexibility in the Presence of New Information
Because uncertainty in benefits and costs characterizes global climate change, the risks of
premature or unnecessary actions need to be compared with the risks of failing to take actions that
subsequently prove to be warranted (Goulder, 2000).  Hence, many economic analyses have
advocated a sequential decision-making approach to climate change policy that would facilitate the
modification and adaptation of policies as new information reduces uncertainties.  Because such new
information is potentially of great value, flexible policies (that adapt to new information) have
significant advantages over more rigid policy mechanisms (Arrow et al., 1996).
2.6  Participation and Compliance
When economists consider domestic environmental problems, they ordinarily put aside
participation and compliance issues by assuming (quite reasonably in some cases) the existence of
a sovereign government vested with effective, coercive powers.  In the international domain,
however, full national sovereignty for individual nations means that free rider problems would likely10These include the developed nations plus economies in transition.
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undermine adequate participation and compliance.  Countries can engage in free riding behavior
through either non-participation or non-compliance, and so at a fundamental level this criterion asks
whether a given climate change policy architecture is likely to deter free riding.
A truly efficient (and, hence, cost-effective) climate change agreement would secure full
participation by all countries, with each and every country mitigating its emissions to the point
where its own marginal abatement costs equaled the sum of marginal benefits globally.  But taking
the behavior of other countries as given, each country can do better by mitigating only up to the
point where its own marginal benefit equals its marginal cost.  As long as global marginal benefits
exceed every nation’s own marginal benefits, countries will either want to avoid participating or
avoid complying fully, if they do participate.  Successful international cooperation must change
these incentives.
Full participation and compliance are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a
dynamically efficient and cost-effective climate change policy.  For example, an international
agreement may be watered down so much that every country participates and complies, and yet the
treaty achieves next to nothing.  Ideally, a treaty would sustain full participation and compliance
while at the same time implementing the dynamically efficient level of climate mitigation.  The
constraint of sovereignty, however, may make this ideal unattainable (Barrett, 2003).
One alternative is a “narrow-but-deep” agreement — one that achieves substantial per-party
mitigation, but attracts relatively little participation.  Another alternative is a “broad-but-shallow”
agreement — one that achieves relatively little per-country mitigation, but attracts nearly full
participation among nations.  Current understanding of the benefit and cost functions characterizing
climate change suggests that the latter type of policy is more likely to satisfy the dynamic efficiency
criterion.  Since marginal emissions control costs increase steeply, a broad-but-shallow policy would
result in lower overall costs (Barrett, 2002).  Moreover, a broad-but-shallow policy could mitigate
emissions leakage.
3.  ALTERNATIVE GLOBAL CLIMATE TREATY ARCHITECTURES
We now turn to a review of the fundamental architecture of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and the fundamental characteristics of thirteen alternative
international approaches to the climate change problem (Table 1).
3.1  The Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in 1992 in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, agreement was reached on the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC), which established as its ultimate objective the “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.”  As an interim step, the FCCC imposed a non-binding goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by industrialized countries (the so-called Annex I countries
10) to their11The Kyoto Protocol designates those countries with emissions commitments as Annex B countries.  With only a few
exceptions, the set of countries with Annex B commitments is identical to the set of Annex I countries in the FCCC.
12Transition economy countries were allowed to use a base year other than 1990 if their economic transition from central
planning began prior to that date.  Countries may also choose to employ 1995 as the base year for measuring changes
in emissions of the synthetic greenhouse gases (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride).
13Note, however, that the European Union can reallocate its emissions allocations among the 15 EU members through
the “bubble” provision of the Kyoto Protocol (Article 4).  Under this reallocation, the emissions commitments of EU
members would range between 28 percent below to 27 percent above 1990 levels.
14It is this “hot air” in the German and British targets that render European Union compliance under its Kyoto bubble
possible at low cost.  According to one recent estimate, fully 80 percent of the EU targets will be achieved by Germany
and the United Kingdom (Andersen, 2002).
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1990 levels by the year 2000.  The FCCC allowed countries flexibility to develop and implement
their own domestic policies to achieve their goals, and provided additional flexibility by allowing
Annex I countries to sponsor emissions abatement and sequestration projects in other countries
through “joint implementation” (a form of project-based emissions trading).  Signed initially by 161
nations, the FCCC entered into force in January, 1994 after being ratified by 50 countries (including
the United States). Today, the FCCC has 187 parties, more than any other international
environmental agreement (Barrett, 2003).
In December, 1997, some 160 countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework
Convention.  Subsequent negotiations filled in many of the details of the Protocol, and the treaty was
substantially completed by November, 2001. While the Protocol maintains the principle of
differentiated responsibilities by the industrialized and developing worlds, it imposes ambitious
targets and timetables for emissions reductions by industrialized nations, and it expands significantly
the opportunities for countries to achieve their commitments cost-effectively through emissions
trading and other “flexible mechanisms.”  The agreement stipulates “binding” commitments,
although, as we explain below, the nature of the requirement that commitments be binding remains
unsettled.
The Kyoto Protocol provides specific greenhouse gas emissions commitments for 38
industrialized (Annex B) countries for the 2008-2012 “commitment period.”
11  These emissions
targets are expressed relative to countries’ emissions in the year 1990.
12  The relative commitments
range from 8 percent below 1990 levels (for the European Union) to 10 percent above 1990 levels
(in the case of Australia).
13  Considering the growth of some economies subsequent to 1990, and the
essential collapse of others, the range of implicit targets is much greater, with the United States
facing a target of about 30 percent below business-as-usual (BAU) levels in 2012, and Russia and
other economies in transition facing targets that would allow substantial increases in emissions
above anticipated BAU levels in 2012.  Likewise, Germany’s apparently ambitious Kyoto target of
an 8 percent reduction translates into a targeted increase in emissions, due to the post-1990
reunification of the two German nations, and the United Kingdom’s target of an 8 percent reduction
likewise translates into a targeted emissions increase, due to the privatization of British coal mining
and the opening up of North Sea natural gas sources.
14  These targets apply to six classes of15The agreement does not specify any obligations beyond 2012. These would have to be negotiated in a new agreement
(possibly, an amendment), which would be binding only on the countries that ratified it, provided that the new
agreement entered into legal force.
16This has confounded the attempts of two countries — Argentina and Kazakhstan — to adopt emissions commitments
and participate within the Kyoto framework.
17Greenhouse gas emissions are aggregated based on their 100-year global warming potentials, and are reported in terms
of “carbon dioxide equivalent.”  Refer to Schmalensee (1993), Reilly et al. (1999), and Manne and Richels (2000) for
a discussion of the economics of global warming potentials. 
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greenhouse gases:  carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
15
The Kyoto Protocol acknowledged and reinforced the FCCC’s principle of “common but
differentiated responsibilities.” Unlike industrialized nations, developing countries have no specific
obligations to abate greenhouse gas emissions under the Protocol, and the Protocol provides no
mechanism for developing countries to adopt emissions commitments voluntarily.
16
The Kyoto Protocol includes three flexibility mechanisms that can help countries achieve
their commitments at lower costs:  international emissions trading, joint implementation, and the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  The international emissions trading mechanism allows
Annex B countries to trade portions of their assigned amounts (targeted emissions) with one another,
whereas the joint implementation mechanism allows these same countries to cooperate on projects
and transfer emissions allowances on the basis of such projects.  The CDM allows Annex B
countries to finance projects in non-Annex B countries in exchange for credits towards meeting their
own emission reduction commitments.
The Protocol implicitly allows for trading across different types of gases and some limited
trading across time.  Since emissions commitments represent the weighted sum of a country’s net
emissions of greenhouse gases,
17 the Protocol implicitly allows inter-gas trading.  By focusing on
net emissions, the Protocol allows for (potentially cost-effective) substitution of carbon sequestration
for greenhouse-gas abatement.  Emissions quotas refer to five-year averages, and countries are
allowed to bank and borrow emissions allowances within this five-year window.  Countries may also
bank (but not borrow) emissions allowances for use in future, as-yet-undefined commitment periods.
Unlike the underlying FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that emissions commitments are
legally binding. At the same time, however, Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol prohibits use of a
compliance mechanism entailing “binding consequences” unless adopted by means of an
amendment.  A compliance mechanism was agreed to in Bonn in July 2001:  any industrialized
country that fails to comply with its first commitment period obligation must make up for this
shortfall in the second commitment period with a 30 percent penalty.  This mechanism will fail to
alter behavior for several reasons. First, by Article 18, the penalty cannot apply to any country
without that country consenting to be bound by it, assuming that the penalty were even included in
a future amendment. Second, the penalty applies to a future control period, and a country would
have to agree to the emission limit applying in such a period.  A country could insist on a generous
future limit, taking any sting out of the penalty.  Finally, the mechanism relies entirely on self-18These included the member states of the European Union, Canada, Japan, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Norway, Romania, and Slovakia.
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punishment. Other countries do not take any actions to enforce compliance with the compliance
mechanism itself.
The Kyoto architecture can be summarized as including four elements:  ambitious, short-term
reduction targets for industrialized countries; no emissions obligations for developing countries;
flexibility for countries to achieve their commitments through market-based mechanisms; and non-
compliance sanctioned with a penalty (not yet binding) linked to commitments in subsequent
periods.
As of January, 2003, the Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by 104 parties (nations) to the
FCCC.  To enter into force, Kyoto must be ratified by at least 55 countries, accounting for at least
55 percent of 1990 Annex I CO2 emissions.  Only the latter trigger for entry into force remains to
be fulfilled.  As of January, 2003, 28 Annex I countries had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, accounting
for 43.9 percent of 1990 Annex I emissions.
18
Entry into force will thus require participation by other Annex I countries, especially Russia.
To secure the participation of Russia (and other Annex I countries, including Japan), negotiating
parties made concessions in Bonn and Marrakech. Giving these countries more (sink) allowances
effectively relaxed the emissions constraints negotiated previously in Kyoto.  These changes reduced
the environmental effectiveness of the protocol and illustrate the potential trade-offs between
participation incentives and the environmental outcome of an international agreement. This may hint
at a key consequence of the Kyoto agreement: it may not achieve high participation and compliance
while reducing emissions substantially. For example, while Canada has ratified the agreement, it has
signaled its intention to count exports of “clean energy” to the United States towards its emission
reduction obligations. This accounting violates the treaty, suggesting that compliance may prove to
be a significant problem for the Kyoto Protocol, even if the agreement enters into force.
Environmentalists have supported the Kyoto Protocol partly because it has been “the only
game in town” and partly because of the expectation that, with time, the emission limitations
achieved by this agreement can be strengthened.  The agreement, however, will not achieve
substantial mitigation, in the short term or in the long term, partly because it fails to promote
participation and compliance.  This further undermines dynamic efficiency, although analyses of the
Kyoto agreement with U.S. participation show that this policy’s global emissions path would be
severely sub-optimal (Nordhaus, 2001).  Kyoto does incorporate mechanisms aimed at promoting
cost-effectiveness, but the success of these ultimately depends on the ability of the agreement to
achieve the agreed emission limits.
The agreement champions “distributional equity” by placing the burden of mitigation upon
industrialized countries, but in so doing it sacrifices efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The Clean
Development Mechanism, likely to bear substantial transaction costs, cannot correct for this failure.
By establishing the precedent of negotiating one five-year commitment period at a time, the
Kyoto agreement promotes a flexible approach that can account for new information in subsequent19It has been suggested that it is important for all countries — developing, as well as industrialized — to take on
emission targets, because:  (1) developing countries will account for more than half of global emissions by 2020, if not
before; (2) developing countries provide the greatest opportunities now for relatively low-cost emissions reductions;
and (3) if developing countries are not included, Annex B abatement will shift comparative advantage in the production
of carbon-intensive goods and services outside of that coalition of countries, and render developing economies more
carbon-intensive than they otherwise would be (see our discussion of emissions leakage in section 2.1, above).
20Most other critiques of the Protocol may be thought of as referring more to the details than to the general structure
(architecture) of the agreement.  For example, Hahn and Stavins (1999) note that the international emissions trading
program outlined in Article 17 is unlikely to be truly cost-effective if it is implemented through a heterogeneous set of
domestic policy instruments.
21The hybrid approach combining a tradable permit system with a “tax” (elastic supply of additional permits) has been
examined by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997), Kopp, Morgenstern, and Pizer (1997), and Kopp, Morgenstern, Pizer,
and Toman (1999), building on earlier work by Weitzman (1974) and Roberts and Spence (1976).  A recent assessment
is provided by Jacoby and Ellerman (2002).
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negotiations and emissions commitments.  This approach also highlights a tension between a
flexible, adaptive regime that incorporates new information, and a policy that provides more
certainty by setting longer-term emissions commitments.   The additional certainty of long-term
commitments may provide sufficient incentive for investments in long-lived capital that may not
occur under a system of periodically negotiated five-year periods.  Some proposed long-term
emissions paths may fail to provide such an incentive, however, if they are not dynamically
consistent (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001).  The Kyoto agreement also fails to promote
participation and compliance, evident by the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, the effective
prohibition on the adoption of emissions commitments by developing countries, and the weak self-
enforcement regime under Article 18.
3.2  Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol
Thus the Kyoto Protocol’s architecture has been criticized on a variety of grounds, including:
it imposes high costs and unfair burdens on some industrialized countries; it effectively forbids
developing countries from taking on emissions commitments;
19 it provides ineffective incentives for
participation; and it generates modest short-term climate benefits while failing to provide a long-
term solution.  In response to these and other perceived flaws
20 in the agreement and in response to
uncertainty regarding the agreement’s future given the declared non-participation by the United
States, a variety of alternatives have been proposed.  These proposals have been advanced in venues
ranging from one-page editorials to book-length manuscripts.  In the remainder of this section, we
briefly describe the key architectural elements of each proposal, taking the proposals in alphabetical
order according to their authors.
3.2.1  A Hybrid International Trading Program  (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001)
This first proposal is for a hybrid international trading instrument that combines an
international trading mechanism, not unlike that found in the Kyoto Protocol, with a safety-valve
or price ceiling, to be implemented by an international agency making available additional permits
at a fixed price.
21  Proceeds from the sale of additional permits would finance climate change
research and aid developing countries’ efforts to abate greenhouse gas emissions.  Developing22Our assessments of the alternative policy architectures are summarized in Table 2.
23For other commentaries on the potential for employing technological cooperation as a central architectural element,
see:  Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo, and Marchiori (2002); Edmonds, Roop, and Scott (2001); Flannery (2001); and
Jacoby (1998).
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countries would be included in the short term via voluntary measures and in the longer term via
mandatory commitments.
The near-term environmental effectiveness of this proposal would depend upon the breadth
of actual participation by developing countries.
22  The use of a safety valve may limit emissions
reductions in contrast with a pure quantity system, but could deliver more environmental benefits
than a pure quantity system if the proceeds from the safety valve provide sufficient incentive for
developing countries to adopt emissions commitments.  The hybrid price-quantity approach under
this policy could approach efficiency in light of uncertainty in both costs and benefits.  Support for
full, unrestricted emissions trading could also promote cost-effective attainment of emissions
commitments, especially once developing country participation becomes mandatory.
The authors of this proposal recommend a sequential process for determining emissions
commitments and safety-valve prices in lieu of fixing such commitments over the long-term,
allowing for policy adaptation to new information over time.  Reflecting the ability to pay notion
of equity, they suggest that developing countries should participate to the extent possible in the near
term, with those adopting emissions commitments participating and enjoying economic gains from
international emissions trading.  Funds accruing from the sale of extra emissions permits through
the safety valve could support emissions abatement efforts in developing countries as well.
To promote compliance, Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz recommend experimenting with social
and economic (trade) sanctions.  Some critics believe that trade restrictions would be difficult to
calculate and prone to political manipulation.  They could also allow for a sequence of reprisals and
counter-reprisals that would damage trade relations.
3.2.2  A Research and Development Protocol (Barrett, 2001, 2003)
This proposal is for a fundamentally different approach, emphasizing common incentives
for climate-friendly technology research and development, rather than targets and time tables.  His
approach includes a research and development (R&D) protocol that would support collaborative
research, and protocols that would require common standards for technologies identified through
collaborative research efforts.  Barrett maintains that the departure from emissions commitments and
market-based instruments is the necessary cost of designing a participation- and compliance-
compatible regime.  His proposal also includes a protocol aimed at making some short term
progress, but without reliance on international enforcement.
This proposal could potentially support a high degree of environmental effectiveness,
depending on the payoffs to the cooperative R&D efforts,
23 but the system would neither be efficient
nor cost-effective, not least because the technology standards would not apply to every sector of the24This may also be a problem with other proposals
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global economy, and may entail some technological lock-in.
24  Equity is considered explicitly, and
flexibility would be aided by the public investment in basic research, although it may be hampered
by lock-in. The real strength in this proposal lies in the incentives it would create for participation
and compliance. Basic R&D would lower the cost of developing new technologies. Economies of
scale, network externalities, and automatic trade restrictions would also make diffusion of the new
technologies more attractive to each country, the greater the number of countries adopting the
technology protocols. Minimum participation would need to be set high enough to ensure that
participation was tipped.
3.2.3  A Portfolio Approach (Benedick, 2001)
This proposal is similar to Barrett’s approach, and emphasizes (long-term) international
standards and incentives for technology innovation and diffusion, but also includes a renegotiation
of the Kyoto targets and a process in which participation in negotiations expands over time.  The
approach is to adopt a portfolio of policies, including a small carbon tax to fund new technology
research, to move the international community toward a desirable technology strategy.
The proposal can reasonably be viewed as a blend of several other proposals.  Like Barrett,
Benedick proposes the adoption of standards, but unlike Barrett’s, this proposal is not strategic in
focus.  The proposal is aimed at achieving environmental effectiveness, but it would be less
successful in supporting efficiency or cost-effectiveness, partly because it focuses on the advantage
of limiting negotiations to a relatively small subset of countries.  Enforcement is not considered.
3.2.4  International Emissions Trading Without a Cap  (Bradford, 2002)
This proposal is the equivalent of an international emissions trading program without a fixed
cap on emissions.  All nations, including developing countries, are allocated permits  equivalent to
their anticipated business-as-usual time path of emissions.  Periodically, an international authority
offers to purchase (and retire) emissions allowances.  Distributional issues are handled through the
financing of the international authority, with differential funding responsibilities being established
on the basis of per capita income levels and other criteria.
The environmental effectiveness of Bradford’s proposal would depend on the magnitude of
countries’ contributions to the central authority responsible for purchasing emissions allowances.
While countries have incentives to sell emissions reductions (so long as the bidding price exceeds
marginal costs), the proposal may not adequately induce participation in the financing scheme.  This
approach reveals the costs of participation in a much more transparent manner than other policies,
such as straight quantity-based systems that allow for devolution to the private sector.  It has the
advantage of letting countries know how much they would be spending — in total — on climate
change mitigation. However, it also has the disadvantage, because of its transparency, of possibly
becoming a lightning rod for political opponents.
Subject to this financing participation constraint, the central authority could purchase
emissions allowances from countries over time consistent with a dynamically efficient emissions25lterative approaches may be vulnerable to similar gaming behavior. The Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, for example, creates
incentives for “paper trades,” and the Kyoto emission limits for certain key countries were diluted in the Conference
of the Parties (Six) negotiations in Bonn and Marrakech.  Bradford’s bidding approach may also be vulnerable to
strategic manipulation.
13
path.  The process of soliciting bids for emissions allowances would result in cost-effective
emissions abatement.  This policy reflects several equity principles.  Bradford recommends that a
country’s financial contribution to the central authority depend on its per capita income (ability to
pay) and the benefits it will incur from climate change mitigation (distribution of benefits).  As new
information becomes available, the central authority could adjust its plans to purchase emissions
allowances accordingly, allowing for substantial policy flexibility, so long as countries adequately
finance this authority. There is no suggestion how the agreement would enforce either contributions
to the international authority or the emissions limits associated with the purchase scheme.
3.2.5  Harmonized Domestic Carbon Taxes  (Cooper, 1998, 2001)
This proposal is conceptually distant from the Kyoto framework:  instead of multilateral
negotiations over national emissions quotas, countries would negotiate a set of common actions
aimed at achieving global emissions targets.  In particular, a harmonized carbon tax would be used
by all participating nations — industrialized and developing alike — to tax their domestic carbon
usage at a common rate, thereby achieving cost effectiveness.
This proposal by Cooper (1998, 2001) for a uniform, harmonized carbon tax raises a number
of problems.  First, developing countries may argue that it is unfair that they should adopt the same
tax as industrialized countries, given that the latter are largely responsible for the climate change
problem in the first place.  Second, developing countries may have little incentive to adopt such a
tax (or, indeed, substantial mitigation effected by a different policy instrument), though transfers
could be used to promote participation by developing countries.  Finally, adoption of a harmonized
tax may create incentives for gaming behavior.  Countries may change their tax codes, for example,
to neutralize the effect of a carbon tax.
25
Overall, Cooper’s proposal for a uniform carbon tax shares many of the strengths of an ideal
quantity-based approach (with perfect trading).  Indeed, under certain conditions, the fundamental
difference between the two approaches depends only on the existence of uncertainty in mitigation
costs (Weitzman 1974).  The weakness in Cooper’s proposal is also similar to the weakness in
quantity-based proposals, and in the Kyoto Protocol itself:  the difficulty in enforcing participation
and compliance.  Cooper (2000) addresses the compliance issue, but drawing on Chayes and Chayes
(1995), he argues that explicit mechanisms for compliance are not needed (refer to part 4, below,
for a discussion of this point).
3.2.6  A Portfolio of Case Studies (Hahn, 1998)
Another significant departure from the “targets and time tables model” is provided by Hahn
(1998), who proposes experimentation with multiple “case studies” of potential policy instruments
to abate greenhouse gas emissions in the short term, including:  coordinated measures; an emissions
tax; tradable emission permits among some set of industrialized nations; tradable emission permits14
among industrialized nations with joint implementation for developing countries; and a hybrid
system.
It is difficult to assess this approach, because it depends upon the particular set of case
studies that are examined, and upon their performance (and hence ultimate adoption).  It can be said,
however, that the approach could well be cost effective, given the apparent focus on market-based
instruments.  Also, this is a highly flexible approach, given the reliance on learning by doing.
Essentially no attention is given to issues of participation and compliance.
3.2.7  Domestic Hybrid Trading Schemes (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997, 2000, 2002)
This is largely a price-based approach, with two domestic markets for tradable permits —
one for annual emissions and another for perpetuities (“endowments”).  As in other proposals,
governments would provide a safety-valve of permit sales at a fixed price (which can rise over time).
Endowments would be made to both industrialized and developing countries, the latter well in
excess of current or anticipated emissions to allow for economic growth.  In this proposal, there is
no international trading system.
The McKibbin and Wilcoxen proposal would likely deliver modest environmental
effectiveness in the near term with its fixed emissions permit price of $10 per ton.  As a relatively
flexible policy approach, the authors advocate international negotiations to set the emissions permit
price once per decade.  To induce developing country participation, McKibbin and Wilcoxen
recommend that developing countries receive emissions endowments in excess of current emissions.
In contrast with proposals that allow developing countries to gain from selling unused emissions
allowances to developed countries, this proposal implies only modest costs in the near term (from
investments anticipating positive domestic permit prices in the future).  Although it distinguishes
between developed and developing countries in terms of their near-term emissions abatement, the
policy may address equity concerns to a lesser degree than other proposals that use some form of
implicit side-payments for developing countries.  The lack of any explicit or implicit side-payments
may result in non-participation by these countries.
Like several other proposals, this architecture does not address the broader participation and
compliance incentives problem.  If these problems were overcome, however, the approach could
achieve cost-effective emissions abatement in the long term (once developing countries’ emissions
permit prices equaled the price in developed countries), and perhaps close to cost-effectiveness in
the short term.  This could support an emissions path broadly consistent with dynamic efficiency,
depending on the emissions prices set at the decadal climate policy negotiations.
3.2.8  An Efficient Set of Harmonized Carbon Taxes (Nordhaus, 1998)
This proposal combines the notion of harmonized carbon taxes with attention to the
efficiency of the targets.  This is done by setting the harmonized carbon tax at the efficient level
through a dynamic benefit-cost analysis, where the benefits are determined through an international
voting mechanism which is intended to reflect countries’ true willingness-to-pay.  As in other
proposals, developing countries participate only when their per capita incomes reach particular26In a subsequent paper, Nordhaus (2002) provides a detailed comparison of price-based and quantity-based
architectures, in which he strongly favors the former.  The architecture which is recommended includes harmonized
carbon taxes with relatively modest short-term tax levels that increase significantly over time, combined with a
mechanism for developing countries to take on increasing degrees of responsibility over time.
27With full compliance, the policy is cost-effective among all participating countries (through the harmonized carbon
tax), but implicit prices on carbon emissions would vary among participating and non-participating countries.
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threshold levels.  Compliance is promoted through import duties, which are levied on goods from
non-participant countries, based on carbon content, with goods from poor countries exempted.
26
The proposed harmonized carbon taxes in the Nordhaus proposal would likely deliver
modest environmental effectiveness in the near term.  He recommends a low carbon tax applied only
to countries above an income threshold.   Consistent with an ability-to-pay notion of distributional
equity, this proposal requires emissions abatement efforts only among wealthy countries.  Nordhaus
suggests that some form of financial side-payment will be necessary to induce developing country
participation.  While the policy explicitly incorporates a mechanism based on a dynamic benefit-cost
analysis, the distinction between participating and non-participating countries undermines the
dynamic efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the proposal.
27  By allowing countries to reveal
periodically their willingness to pay for climate protection, this policy structure can adjust and adapt
to new information.
3.2.9  A Global Climate Marshall Plan (Schelling, 1997, 1998, 2000)
This proposed climate policy architecture is inspired by the process of dividing up resources
made available by a “Marshall Plan.” The approach would be for the industrialized countries to
accept mutually agreed actions.  International mechanisms in pursuit of targets and time tables (such
as international permit trading) are dismissed, although domestic market-based instruments are
recommended.
Schelling’s proposal starts from the premise that substantial enforcement, requiring effective
penalties for non-compliance, is needed but cannot be supported by existing international institutions
(which do not have the authority to levy credible threats of significant penalties for non-
compliance).  His approach is thus to look at measures that might be adopted without such penalties.
Starting from this premise, Schelling’s proposal would presumably not reduce emissions
substantially, and so would not receive high marks for environmental effectiveness.  He recognizes
the desirability of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, but his proposal does not incorporate
mechanisms aimed at satisfying these criteria.  However, financial transfers to developing countries
would help reduce emissions cost-effectively, while at the same time satisfying some notion of
equity. Schelling recognizes the need for flexibility, but his approach has neither advantages nor
disadvantages in this regard as compared with most of the alternatives. Participation and compliance
are not directly enforced, nor does this approach require enforcement.  Indeed, it is predicated on
enforcement being inevitably weak.28See, for example:  Frankel (1999).  In 1999, the Argentine government offered to take on an emissions commitment
indexed to its economic growth.  Lutter (2000) provides an analysis.
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3.2.10  A Broad but Shallow Beginning (Schmalensee, 1996, 1998)
Schmalensee (1996, 1998) focuses on two dimensions of an international climate change
agreement:  the breadth of the coalition of countries that are meaningfully participating; and the
depth of their commitment (stringency of targets).  He argues that the most productive first step is
to include as many countries as possible, but not require very severe reductions.  He terms this a
broad and shallow approach, in contrast with the Kyoto Protocol, which he characterizes as being
narrow and deep.  Schmalensee’s argument is that getting a large number of nations to make
commitments now is the best strategy for building the depth and breadth necessary in the long term
to address the problem in meaningful ways.
In terms of environmental effectiveness, this approach would have relatively small effects
in the short term, but significant effects in the long term.  If the targets are sufficient, it could thus
be dynamically efficient.  Likewise, this approach could be cost effective, due to its reliance on
market-based instruments to achieve targets.  Little attention is given to cross-sectional equity, but
the time path may be consistent with intertemporal equity.  The approach provides considerable
flexibility by starting off with modest targets.  No attention is given to participation and compliance.
3.2.11  A Three-Part Policy Architecture (Stavins, 2001b)
This policy architecture is consistent with the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
but departs from the Kyoto Protocol:  (1) all countries participate, with an explicit mechanism
providing for voluntary accession by developing countries, and a trigger, linked with per capita
income, which would require developing countries to take on “growth targets,” commitments that
are a function of per capita income and other negotiated factors;
28 (2) in aggregate, short-term targets
that are moderate yet rigid, and long-term targets — put in place now — that are much more
ambitious (in order to induce needed technological change), but flexible to respond to learning; and
(3) market-based instruments, including international permit trading, possibly with a safety-valve.
In terms of environmental effectiveness, abatement would be very modest in the short term,
but much more ambitious in the long term.  Depending upon the specific time path of adopted
targets, this could yield dynamic efficiency.  In any event, there is considerable promise of cost
effectiveness, due to reliance on tradable permits, carbon taxes, and related hybrid systems.  Cross-
sectional distributional equity can be addressed through the initial allocation of permits to
developing countries and the use of growth targets.  Flexibility is maintained by using firm (but
modest) targets in the short term, but flexible (but more ambitious) targets in the long term, to allow
for response to learning.  Like many of the architectural proposals, there is little direct attention
given to participation and compliance, although the incentives for developing countries to participate
could be considerable.29This would be the international version of an “emission reduction credit” program, as opposed to a “cap-and-trade”
program (see Stavins, 2002 for definitions and examples), and can be thought of — in the Kyoto Protocol context —
as a national-level CDM policy.
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3.2.12  Using Quotas to Attract Developing Countries (Stewart and Wiener, 2001)
This approach focuses on increasing developing country participation by four instruments:
(1) a streamlined CDM; (2) voluntary participation in emissions trading without emissions quotas;
29
(3) mechanisms for voluntary accession to the emissions quota system; and (4) automatic graduation
to the quota system given particular per capita incomes having been reached. Stewart and Wiener
(2001) specifically focus on the need to secure the participation of major developing countries such
as China and India by giving these countries “headroom allowances” — allocations in excess of their
likely BAU emissions.
The proposal is intended to increase participation in a Kyoto-like agreement by reducing
emissions reduction burdens in the near term.  The authors suggest that developing countries should
have the option to adopt voluntary emissions commitments with headroom emissions allowances
as the necessary, implicit side-payment.  With international emissions trading, this could further
reduce the environmental effectiveness from the current status of the Kyoto agreement.  While this
provides an economic incentive for developing countries to participate, it does not address the
participation and compliance incentive problems for developed countries or for developing countries
once they are no longer net exporters of emissions allowances in future commitment periods.
The participation and compliance concerns hinder dynamic efficiency and cost-effectiveness,
although the policy does aim to improve on both dimensions by expanding opportunities to take
advantage of low-cost emissions abatement in developing countries.  The proposal addresses equity
concerns by requiring developed countries to finance emissions abatement in developing countries,
whether through the expanded CDM or trade in emissions allowances under developing country
commitments.  It maintains essentially the same structure and timing as the Kyoto agreement, and
so is comparable in its flexibility with respect to new information.
3.2.13  Increasing Compliance through Buyer Liability (Victor, 2001)
Finally, Victor (2001) proposes an approach that in the short term is similar to the Kyoto
Protocol, except that individual countries can buy unlimited numbers of allowances at a specified
price (safety valve).  In the short term, developing countries participate through the CDM, but in the
long term, a graduation mechanism is proposed for developing countries as they reach particular
incomes and then must adopt either quotas (as developed countries) or growth targets.  Compliance,
he argues, would be promoted through a buyer liability scheme.
The environmental effectiveness of this approach is necessarily compromised by its reliance
on a safety-valve approach in the short term, but the overall result could be a time path of emissions
reductions much closer to the dynamically efficient path than that likely to be forthcoming with the
Kyoto Protocol, for example.  Reliance on market-based instruments facilitates cost effectiveness,
and distributional equity is addressed through the use of growth targets.  Although compliance is
considered through the buyer liability scheme, the proposal does not address participation.18
4.  MAJOR THEMES AMONG THE POLICY ARCHITECTURES
Although there is considerable diversity among these thirteen alternatives to the Kyoto
Protocol, a number of themes emerge (some of which are shared by all of the proposals):  use of
relatively moderate short-term goals; provision for increased developing country participation over
time; use of market-based mechanisms; cost constraints through hybrid instruments; and provision
of incentives for participation and compliance (Table 1).
First, many of the proposals reflect a general concern that the Kyoto commitments are “too
little, too fast,” that is, insufficient to do much about the climate change problem, but excessively
ambitious (and hence costly) in the short term.  Therefore, nearly all of the proposals feature
commitments which are moderate in the short-term and become much more stringent in the long-
term.
Second, many proposals maintain that developing countries must play a  more significant
role over time.  Several proposals (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001; Schmalensee, 1996, 1998;
Stavins, 2001b; Stewart and Wiener, 2001) would require developing countries to take on emission
commitments in the near term.  These proposals plus others (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997, 2000,
2002; Nordhaus, 1998; Victor, 2001) recommend some form of graduation:  an income threshold
above which nations must take on emission commitments.  Other proposals include developing
country participation in forms that do not involve emission commitments (Bradford, 2002; Hahn,
1998).  Finally, one proposal would have developing countries participate in the financing of
research and development activities, but with contributions reflecting their differentiated
responsibilities and capabilities (Barrett 2001, 2002b).
Third, a number of proposals provide positive incentives for developing country
participation.  Some would require that developing countries adopt emission ceilings but with “head
room” so that these countries could become net exporters of emission allowances, providing the
resources needed to finance their abatement (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001; Stavins, 2001b;
Stewart and Weiner, 2001). The proposal by Barrett (2001, 2003) would have developing countries
be bound by the technology standards incorporated in separate protocols, but the diffusion of these
technologies in developing countries would be financed by industrialized countries, also an element
of Benedick’s (2001) proposal.
Fourth, nearly all of the proposals would allow, encourage, or require implementation
through market-based instruments.  While Cooper (1998, 2001) advocates harmonized carbon taxes,
most proposals favor hybrid quota-tax schemes (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001; Hahn, 1998,
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997, 2000, 2002; Victor, 2001) or tradable permit systems (Hahn, 1998;
Stavins, 2001b; Stewart and Wiener, 2001).  Bradford’s (2002) proposal could potentially achieve
a similar, cost-effective outcome by implementing a permit purchase scheme.  Efficient
implementation of all such instruments would allow countries to achieve their emissions
commitments at lower cost, which would presumably increase the likelihood that they would comply
with their commitments.  It is precisely because of concerns about compliance/participation,
however, that Barrett (2001, 2003) departs from the conventional economists’ prescription of30This proposal has its own problems (lack of cost-effectiveness, for example), but the important point here is that the
proposal arose from a concern about international enforcement. For most other proposals, enforcement is either assumed
not to be a problem or, as in the Kyoto Protocol itself, an enforcement mechanism is added almost as an afterthought
to an approach that is advocated for other virtues.
31The reasoning embraced by Chayes and Chayes (1995) is flawed in a number of respects. First, evidence that countries
comply is not evidence that compliance is not a problem. Countries may only be complying with agreements that do
not seek to change behavior or that only aim to coordinate. Second, the Chayes’s do not consider the participation
problem. Under the rules of international law, countries are expected to comply with treaties to which they become a
party, but they are not required to participate. A country that worried about its ability to comply would thus choose not
to participate. For critiques of the Chayes’ reasoning, see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoon (1996) and Barrett (1999, 2003).
32A coalition of developing countries rebuffed New Zealand’s call during the 1997 Kyoto Conference of the Parties for
developing country commitments.  The coalition has succeeded in keeping the topic off the agendas of subsequent
Conferences of the Parties.  While the case has been made that developing countries with emissions commitments could
become net exporters of emissions allowances and thus enjoy gains from trade (Yellen, 1998), this argument has
generated little support in the developing world.  Likewise, though Cooper (1998, 2001) suggests that developing
country governments would be favorably disposed toward imposing (harmonized) carbon taxes for public finance (if
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market-based instruments, and advocates collaborative R&D combined with technology standards.
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Schelling’s (1997, 1998) proposal also drops the premise that targets and timetables can be enforced
internationally, although his proposal is not far from unilateralism.
Fifth, in response to concerns about the costs of complying with emissions commitments,
many proposals recommend a hybrid tax-quota or pure price regimes to set a cap on marginal costs
(Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001; Cooper, 1998, 2001; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997, 2000, 2002;
Stavins, 2001b; Victor, 2001).  Other proposals take different approaches to limiting the costs of
climate policy (Barrett, 2001, 2003; Bradford, 2002; Hahn, 1998).
Sixth, although there is widespread recognition that the Kyoto Protocol does not provide
effective incentives for participation and compliance, most proposals give relatively little attention
to this aspect of an international climate agreement, the chief exceptions being Barrett (2001, 2003),
Victor (2001), and Wiener (1999, 2001).   More broadly, advocates of policies to ensure low costs
of attaining emissions commitments believe that such low costs will provide incentives for
participation and compliance. Other authors (Aldy, Orszag, and Stiglitz, 2001; Nordhaus, 1998)
argue that a treaty such as the Kyoto Protocol can, in principle, be enforced by means of trade
restrictions. Barrett (2003) shows how trade restrictions helped enforce other agreements, but he
doubts the efficacy of trade restrictions in enforcing a climate agreement relying on either targets
and timetables or taxes. Cooper (2000) rejects trade restrictions for a different reason.  Citing
Chayes and Chayes (1995), he argues more broadly that sanctions are not needed and that
transparency in governmental actions (monitoring) should provide sufficient incentive for
compliance.
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Any pragmatic proposal addressing developing country participation must confront a
difficult trade-off if the United States is to participate as well.  If a proposal includes aggressive
developing country commitments, the agreement may be expected to fail to elicit developing country
participation, since nearly all developing countries believe that the industrialized world should take
on binding emissions commitments first.
32  On the other hand, if a proposal recommends modest ornot environmental) reasons, no developing country has adopted such a tax. We note as well that a number of major
developing countries have substantial energy subsidies (International Energy Agency, 1999).
33Senate Resolution 98 (June 12, 1997) states that the United States should not be a signatory to any agreement under
the Framework Convention on Climate Change which would “mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse
gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance
period.”  The resolution refers to five developing countries by name:  China, Mexico, India, Brazil, and South Korea.
Subsequently, the Clinton Administration employed the phrase, “meaningful participation by key developing countries”
(Eizenstat, 1998) in a “strategic interpretation” of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
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no near-term emissions commitments by developing countries, the agreement may be expected to
fail to gain political acceptance in the United States, as evidenced by the unanimous (95-0) passage
of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in the U.S. Senate (1997), which called for similar treatment of
industrialized and developing countries in any international agreement on global climate change.
33
The notion of allowing short-term developing country participation exclusively through the CDM
(Victor, 2001) would likely garner little support from the United States, since such participation
would fall well short of the criteria specified by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
As the international community considers efforts to address the risks posed by global climate
change, a number of issues have been raised about the design and potential impacts of climate
change policy.  These issues have served as the basis for our review of the Kyoto Protocol and
thirteen alternative climate change policies.  We have employed six criteria by which to evaluate the
Protocol and these other proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, dynamic cost-
effectiveness, distributional equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and participation
and compliance.  The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well along several of these dimensions, including
environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and participation and compliance.
And none of the thirteen alternative proposals we evaluated fared well along all six dimensions.
This reflects, in part, the fundamental tensions among the criteria.  For example, the typical
policy trade-off between efficiency and equity also characterizes the climate change problem,
especially with respect to the role of developing countries.  Fully efficient and cost-effective
emissions abatement would require developing countries to actively limit their greenhouse gas
emissions, while ability-to-pay and responsibility notions of equity would likely exempt most
developing countries from emissions abatement.  Some proposals attempt to address this conflict
by allocating “headroom” emissions allowances to developing countries and allowing them to
participate in international emissions trading, but this weakens environmental outcomes.  A number
of proposals advocate cost-effective implementation, but this would only occur conditional on
participation and compliance by all countries — a condition most proposals do not effectively
address.  In contrast, proposals that focus on creating incentives for participation and compliance
do so at the expense of cost-effective implementation.  And pursuing policies with a primary goal
of maximizing the environmental outcome may be inconsistent with dynamic efficiency, and could
undermine participation and compliance incentives.21
In our review of the thirteen policy proposals, we identified several common themes: (1)
Kyoto is “too little, too fast” – high costs for a small set of participants with very modest
environmental gains; (2) developing countries should play a more substantial role over time; (3)
incentives should be provided to promote developing country participation; (4) implementation
should focus on market-based approaches; (5) price mechanisms should be a key element of market-
based approaches, either through hybrid tax-quota schemes or emissions taxes; and (6) participation
and compliance incentives merit more consideration and thought than evident in most proposals.
These major themes and the tensions among the relevant criteria for evaluating climate
change policy illustrate the challenge in developing and implementing an international policy regime
that can effectively mitigate climate change risks in an efficient, fair, and inclusive manner.
Common to most policy proposals, including the Kyoto Protocol, is an emphasis on cost-effective
implementation policies and inadequate concern for participation and compliance incentives.
In light of the current international context in which countries representing a majority of the
world’s greenhouse gas emissions will not take on emissions commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol, future analytic work should focus on policies that can attempt to reconcile efficiency and
cost-effectiveness with participation and compliance.  This is certainly no easy task, given the
domestic and international political constraints on climate change policy.  Policy-makers would
certainly benefit from quantitative assessments of these trade-offs.  Various modeling teams have
evaluated the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol.  Comparable assessments of alternative
policy strategies, especially those that are substantially different in form.  Finally, to the extent that
the Kyoto process goes forward, researchers and policy-makers alike should take advantage of the
opportunity to gain information about climate change policy in practice in order to exploit a positive
attribute of the Kyoto agreement — the flexibility to adapt to new information.22
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